Border Crossings as Social Boundaries:

When a Second Passport Becomes a Status Symbol

Yossi Harpaz,

Tel-Aviv University

yharpaz@tauex.tau.ac.il

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Introduction

Early conceptions of globalization revolved around falling walls: from the metaphorical Iron Curtain, through the actual Berlin Wall to countless trade barriers the world over. The observation that people, goods and ideas were circulating more freely than ever was also associated with the expectation that cultural differences and economic gaps should decline (McDonald's restaurants provided the most emblematic symbol of this process). Following the optimistic 1990s, however, and especially after the 2008 economic crisis, scholars have been paying increasing attention to the "darker" sides of globalization – above all, the exacerbation of inequality.

One perspective focused on global inequality and pointed out the role of citizenship (or nationality – I will use the terms synonymously here) as a key institution that defines individuals' place within hierarchical global structures (e.g. Shachar 2009). A second analytical perspective focused on cross-border mobility (e.g. Bauman 1998). Numerous scholars pointed out that globalization is not just about the tearing-down of walls but is equally about the construction and new barriers and the reinforcement of new ones. The growth in international mobility, rather than erasing differences, has actually made the crossing of borders an ever more salient mechanism of stratification. Passport control checkpoints are a key site where differences in mobility and status come into individuals' lived experience.

This paper connects these two literatures – on global inequality and mobility – and applies them to the analysis of an emergent global phenomenon: the legitimation and proliferation of dual citizenship (Harpaz and Mateos, forthcoming). Since the 1990s, dozens of countries have changed their laws to permit dual citizenship. For many people outside the West – especially in Eastern Europe and Latin America – this presented an attractive opportunity to obtain a second citizenship from a Western country. Millions have acquired European Union (EU) or U.S. citizenship on the basis of their ancestry, ethnic identity, birthplace or migration history (Harpaz 2015). Typically, those dual citizens do not emigrate to their new countries of citizenship; instead, they use their Western citizenship to secure broader opportunities, an "insurance policy" and improved mobility. I refer to this phenomenon as *compensatory citizenship* (Harpaz, forthcoming).

The phenomenon of compensatory citizenship offers a novel perspective from which to explore the intersection of inequality and mobility. I will draw on two case studies of compensatory citizenship that I have conducted in 2014-2016: Serbians who acquire Hungarian (EU) citizenship and Israelis who acquire citizenship from their EU countries of origin (most commonly from

Germany, Poland or Romania). In both cases, the study does not deal with immigrants but with people who have acquired compensatory citizenship in a long-distance manner.

The findings from those cases demonstrate that individuals around the world understand international mobility as a value in itself, not just an instrumental means to an end; moreover, border crossings are experienced as sites of stratification. Serbians and Israelis with EU citizenship used their passports to boost their cross-border mobility and, through it, elevate their status within global and local systems of stratification. For Serbians, crossing borders with an EU passport offers them symbolic and practical equality with other Europeans, liberating them from visa requirements that they perceive as unfair and humiliating. In the hands of EU-Israeli dual citizens, the EU passport finds another, rather surprising meaning: it is used to signal social distinction vis-à-vis other Israelis. Dual citizens think of the EU-nationals line in European airports as a VIP line, and take pride in being allowed to use it when other Israelis cannot. These findings demonstrate the emergence of Western citizenship as a valuable resource on a global scale. In a world where mobility has become a key stratifying factor, the possession of a premium passport allows one to claim higher social status, whether in global hierarchies (as in Serbia) or local ones (as in Israel).

In the next two sections, I review the social science literature that has examined global inequality and international mobility. Then, I discuss the legitimation and proliferation of dual citizenship since the 1990s. I then proceed to presenting empirical material on EU dual citizenship in Israel and Serbia, showing how mobility and status intersect in those cases. In conclusion, I discuss the implications for studying global inequality and suggest directions for future research.

New Perspectives on Global inequality

Economic inequality between different countries and societies is nothing new. For most of history, however, the population of most countries was rural and agrarian, and tiny elites appropriated almost all of the surplus production (Piketty 2014). This meant that differences in the *average* quality of life between countries were relatively small. Starting in the early 19th century, the countries of northwestern Europe and the United States began to industrialize and urbanize. This not only increased economic production, but also drove political enfranchisement which created a push for redistribution (or at least put some limits on elite accumulation). The result was a rapid and unprecedented growth in the living standards for the average person living in those countries. This "great divergence" (Pomeranz 2000) between the West and the rest, which began about 200 years ago, continues to shape our world today.

The two centuries that have elapsed have seen the gaps between countries widen dramatically, and very few countries have caught up with the West. At the beginning of the 19th century, the average income in the richest countries (England and the Netherlands) was only about three times higher than in the poorest countries at the time (China and India) (Milanovic 2010). Today, we find gaps of 14-to-1 (EU average GDP per capita compared to sub-Saharan Africa), 40-to-1 (the United States compared to Haiti) and even 100-to-1 (Norway compared to Eritrea).[1] Moreover, the gaps between different countries extend far beyond income. They affect every conceivable dimension of human life, including security, political freedom, civil rights, access to quality healthcare, exposure to pollution and so on (Harpaz, forthcoming). To put it simply, citizenship is today the status that has the largest impact on an individual's life chances – more than race, gender or social class (Milanovic 2010).

While this state of affairs – a world stratified by nationality – quite old, until the late 2000s, there were relatively few attempts to model and conceptualize global inequality (the exception was the world-system approach, which applied a Marxist analysis of the global division of labor (Wallerstein 1974)). The relative neglect of global inequality is remarkable in light of the extremely prolific social science literature on inequality, which has meticulously explored mechanisms, perceptions, reproduction, pathways of social mobility and other aspects. Almost all of that literature took the nation-state as the unit of analysis. The idea that a "society" is the population of a nation-state (for example, "French society") appeared so self-evident that few scholars even bothered to justify it. This omission is the result of "methodological nationalism" (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002) as well as prevalent Western-centrism. The underlying reasons are intellectual as well as institutional: prestigious universities and journals are located in the West and research funds are mostly available to those who investigate social problems that are relevant to Western policy-makers. Moreover, not much was available in the way of data.

In recent years, however, there has been a surge of interest in global inequality, extending far beyond the traditional domain of world-systems theory and raising new questions and insights. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explain this development, it is clear that this shift was assisted by the availability of new data. More rigorous and detailed collection of statistics by states and international agencies mean that economists and sociologists can now make high-resolutions comparisons and analyses, and develop new ways of analyzing between-country inequality and tying it to within-country inequality (Milanovic 2010; Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009).

The proliferation of new data is not restricted to purely economic measures of income. There is now a wealth of statistics that allow us to compare countries along a huge range of measures: from peace and security, through freedom of the press to women's political

representation to eighth-graders' reading proficiency. Another indicator that has gained substantial interest concerns travel freedom: numerous indices now rank the relative strength of different countries' passports in terms of gaining access to various territories (HVRI 2017; Arton Capital 2017). I will return to these indices of mobility in the next section (p. 10).

These diverse data – most of which were not available for many countries 10 or 20 years ago – allow scholars to model global inequality in new ways. New ways of measuring lead to new ways of imagining humanity as one society, setting the ground for new kinds of normative questions. One of the most influential contributions has been made by Ayelet Shachar, who brought global inequality into the domain of distributive justice (Shachar 2009; Shachar and Hirschl 2007). Shachar's point of departure is that citizenship has become the most important stratifying status in today's world, and therefore the principles governing its allocation should be made a subject of normative discussion. Since for the vast majority of persons, citizenship is determined at birth, the resulting global citizenship regime can be compared to a "birthright lottery" with few winners and many losers (only about 15 percent of the world's population live in Western countries) (see also Macklin 2007; Boatcă 2015). Without getting into the specific remedies that Shachar (2009) proposes, her work illustrates the growing interest in global inequality and the new kinds of questions that it generates.

We thus see the growing salience of global inequality as an object of study and analysis. Empirically, new data allow us to make hitherto-impossible comparisons and analyses; theoretically, the concept of "society" has broadened beyond a nation-state's population; and normatively, scholars have begun to raise questions about global distributive justice. Within this burgeoning literature on global inequality, a particular domain has received special attention:

international mobility. Border crossings, passports and visas have emerged as a privileged site where global inequality can be observed and studied.

The paradigm of mobility (and immobility)

The intensification of international mobility is one of the most salient manifestations of globalization, and it has provided social scientists with a useful analytical lens from which to examine it. Between 1990 and 2011, the number of international tourist arrivals has more than doubled and the number of international students has tripled (Ball and Nikita 2014; UNWTO 2016); and while immigration remained steady as a percentage of world population since the mid-20th century (about 3 percent), it has grown and diversified to impact more countries and more varieties of mobility (Connor 2016).

Studying mobility– not just the movement of people but also the laws and institutions created to regulate such movement – has emerged as a key way of understanding globalization. Soon, researchers realized that the intensification of mobility did not necessary diminish inequality in mobility. Rather, it led to a diversification of unequal types of mobility. For example, when international tourism changed from an elite practice to a form of mass consumption it diversified into travel classes, types of vacations and destinations (e.g. beach resorts, cultural sightseeing, adventure tourism, volunteer activism). Similarly, labor-related mobility has many varieties that diverge in status: starting with immigrants who enter a country illegally, through immigrants who enter legally and overstay their visa, through high-skilled legal immigrants, all the way to elite expats who have all their needs provided by the international companies that send them abroad.

While the connection between mobility and status is obvious and old – just think of slaves, serfs and prisoners who are defined by their lack of freedom of movement – globalization has

created new and intricate modes of interaction between them (*see* Sassen 2006; Ong 1999). One of the first to explore this relationship has been the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, who declared twenty ago: "mobility has become the most powerful and most coveted stratifying factor" (1998:9; cf. Beck 2008). Bauman's main point is that all the promises of the globalized age – free and lightning-fast movement, unrestricted flows of information and communication – would only flow to those already rich and educated enough to benefit from them, while aggravating the exclusion of those without such resources.

In a similar vein, John Urry (2007) and Thomas Faist (2013) have emphasized the role of mobility as a key institution in the present structure of world society – both as an enabler of social relationships and a mechanism that institutionalizes inequality. The sociologist Ronen Shamir (2005) has contributed to this perspective by highlighting the way in which globalization consists not just of "falling borders," as is commonly assumed, but also of processes of "closure, entrapment and containment" (2005:199). Shamir pointed out the "paradigm of suspicion" that governments and private actors apply to unwanted subjects within a series of mobility regimes.

These authors provide a broad, synoptic view of the intricate global system of mobility restrictions and permissions, which is driven by both state and private actors (e.g. shopping malls or gated residential communities). Let us now narrow the focus. The kind of mobility that stands at the focus of this paper – the ability to cross borders – is almost entirely within the purview of the state. One of the central features of the modern state is the monopolization of control over legitimate movement within – and especially into – its territory (Torpey 2000).

In the 18th and 19th centuries, the aspect of internal control ("within" movement) took precedence. States controlled various internal movements – for example, immigration from the countryside to the cities – and used diverse criteria as bases for discrimination, including social

class, religion, race, urban or rural background and political orientation (ibid.). Such internal controls still exist in many countries – most notably in China, where the *hukou* system severely restricts the ability of immigrants from the villages to settle in the cities (King and Skeldon 2010). In most democracies, however, internal passports have gone out of fashion. Moreover, it is no longer acceptable to legally discriminate on the basis of race, gender or religion. Citizenship has remained as the ultimate legitimate basis for legal discrimination (Wimmer 2014). In a world where territory is monopolized by bureaucratic nation-states, the only way to move across borders is to have papers – and they had better be the "right" papers.

The state-governed system of global mobility is organized on the basis of citizenship, and passports require the most conventional proof of citizenship. It is a document that testifies to the tie between a state (represented through its insignia and name) and an individual (represented through a name, a photograph and increasingly through biometric information). Citizenship-based distinctions work in two ways: one is national and binary and the other is global and hierarchical.

On one level, citizenship is the institutional expression of an Us/Them distinction that is at the heart of every nation-state. Nation-states by definition discriminate in favor of their nationals and against non-nationals – for example, in terms of right to enter the territory or access to the labor market (Hindess 1998). Nationals of a country have an unqualified right to enter its territory, while foreigners have no such right and their entry may be denied at will (Salter 2006).

States, however, do not just classify individuals into nationals and foreigners. There is another system which classifies foreigners into different categories based on status and desirability. The world's passports are not equal. Whereas citizens of rich Western countries may travel freely throughout most of the world and are generally welcomed, travelers from most non-Western countries are viewed through a "paradigm of suspicion" (Shamir 2005). Travelers from suspicious

countries must prove that they do not belong to any of the "undesirable" categories, that include illegal immigrants, asylum seekers, criminals and terrorists (Harpaz, forthcoming; *see* Macklin 2007). To alleviate these suspicions, they must obtain a visa before entering the destination country, providing proof of their financial situation, ties to their home country and good character. A second inspection typically takes place at the border crossing itself (Salter 2006). Even once inside the territory, they are often still treated with suspicion by local authorities (Sarabia 2015).

These practices of surveillance and restriction are employed with varying degrees of strictness, depending to a great degree on the traveler's citizenship.[2] One way of quantifying the relative desirability of travelers from different countries – in other words, the travel freedom that they enjoy – is through a simple count of the number of countries that they may visit without need for a visa. Whereas a citizen of Germany or Sweden may visit over 170 countries visa-free, those travelling with Russian or Turkish passports have visa-free access to about 100 countries, Chinese or Indians to around 50 countries and Afghanis only 24 (HVRI 2017).[3] In general, there is a very strong correlation between a country's level of prosperity and stability and the degree of travel freedom that its citizens enjoy (Harpaz, forthcoming).

The global hierarchy of mobility, institutionalized through passports, is an everyday, concrete manifestation of the hierarchy of citizenships. It has been established that humans are powerfully predisposed to identify and react to differences in status. Sensitivity to hierarchies is instilled through socialization, but also seems to have a biological, evolutionary basis. In other words, people cannot remain indifferent to being treated differently. While mobility restrictions are essentially impersonal (they target categories of citizens rather than individuals), travelers often experience the procedures involved in border control – verification of identity, questioning about intentions and background, detention or security search – in a very personal way. Border-crossing

experiences cannot but be perceived as indications of one's place in a social hierarchy and evoke emotions such as shame, pride, pain and pleasure. Ease or difficulty of crossing borders thus carries a much broader meaning than the purely instrumental.

We can conclude that mobility – not just movement itself but also the right to move and the way one is treated while on the move – is an activity that has value in itself, and a powerful force that constitutes subjectivities in today's world. This insight is implicit in the theoretical works on global mobility that were cited above (pp. 7-8). However, the connection between international mobility and status has not been subjected to systematic empirical study that would test its validity and specify the discourses and mechanisms involved.

One work that approached this question is Heidy Sarabia's (2015) study of middle-class Mexican tourists in the United States. Those travelers hold a tourist visa and enter the U.S. legally, and yet their Mexican nationality and phenotype mark them as suspect. This prevents them from enjoying the cosmopolitan status of Western tourists, making them lower-status "global south cosmopolitans" (ibid.). Multiple studies reveal that citizens in the middle-income countries that border the EU (including former Yugoslav and former Soviet countries and Turkey) have a strong sense of constrained mobility and diminished status due to their lack of EU passports (Jansen 2009; Neofotistos 2009; Balta and Altan-Olcay 2016; Kilinç and King 2017; Pogonyi 2017).

There is, then, a need for systematic in-depth research that will allow us to analyze the role that mobility plays in stratification. Such research should analyze mobility in the context of global stratification – but also integrate it with within-nation social and economic stratification. This would make it possible to analyze the intersections and the mechanisms of conversion between those different systems (*see* Bourdieu 1986). In recent decades, the emergence of dual citizenship as a widespread global phenomenon has created institutional openings for converting resources

across local (intra-national) and global social fields. By allowing a person who lives in one country to simultaneously hold a passport from another country, dual citizenship erodes the boundaries between those systems of stratification and provides an opportunity to analyze them together.

The global emergence of dual citizenship

For most of the 20th century, states typically required exclusive allegiance from their citizens and prohibited overlapping memberships. This changed dramatically after 1990. Within two decades, dozens of countries revised their laws to permit dual citizenship. In 1990, less than a third of countries in Europe and the Americas tolerated it; by 2010, it was accepted by almost 80 percent of those countries (Harpaz and Mateos, forthcoming). Many European countries, including Italy and Spain, not only permitted dual citizenship but went farther and invited the descendants of emigrants to "reacquire" citizenship, without having to give up their other citizenship or to move to the granting country. In some cases – particularly in Eastern Europe – such reacquisition schemes are aimed mostly at the descendants of former citizens who have been left outside the nation's borders (and lost their citizenship) as a result of territorial changes (Dumbrava 2014).

Dual citizenship has different characteristics in different parts of the world. In Western countries, it is produced in the context of immigration and can be considered its byproduct. Most dual citizens in countries like Canada, Germany or France are first-generation immigrants who naturalized while retaining their original citizenship or second-generation immigrants who opted for their residence-country citizenship (or received it automatically) while also receiving their origin-country citizenship through *jus sanguinis* laws (Harpaz, forthcoming) Resident citizens of Western countries rarely make active efforts to acquire another citizenship, and get it in a passive manner, through retention during naturalization or transmission at birth. The non-resident

citizenship from the origin country carries mostly sentimental value: for a person who already holds citizenship from, say, France or Germany, a second citizenship from Morocco or Turkey, provides few practical benefits (ibid.).

The situation outside the West is very different. In Eastern Europe and Latin America, as well as in countries like Israel, Turkey or Taiwan, people make deliberate efforts to secure a second citizenship from Western countries (the citizenship all EU member countries functions as Western citizenship, for that matter). Applicants acquire such dual citizenship in a long-distance manner on the basis of their ancestry or ethnicity, or even strategically give birth or naturalize in a country with the aim of securing its citizenship (Harpaz 2016, forthcoming; Balta and Altan-Olcay 2016; Mateos 2013). Over 2.5 million persons have acquired ancestry- or ethnicity-based dual citizenship from EU countries in this manner between 1998 and 2014, with particularly large numbers of applicants coming from Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Serbia, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine (Harpaz 2015).[4] I call this second, higher-tier citizenship *compensatory citizenship*. Typically, it is not acquired with the intention of emigrating and does not replace the original resident citizenship. Instead, the Western citizenship helps secure additional opportunities, security, status and mobility – in other words, to make up for the limitations of the non-Western citizenship. The high demand for such citizenship outside the West provide proof of its (perceived) practical usefulness (ibid.).

Compensatory citizenship is a bottom-up strategy of global upward mobility. It allows individuals and families to improve their position in the global hierarchy of citizenship and mobility, without having to actually immigrate to another country. The acquisition of a second citizenship represents the conversion of pre-existing resources – European ancestry, an ethnic identity, economic capital, social connections and know-how – into a new global asset, the EU passport (or an American or Canadian passport). The global advantages provided by the passport

can then be used to improve the dual citizen's position within his or her home society. Thus, dual citizenship creates an opening that allows for the conversion of resources between global and national systems of stratification.

Typically, those who acquire compensatory citizenship wish to enjoy the benefits of Western citizenship without immigrating to the granting country. In other words, they seek the mobility value encapsulated in its passport. Most of the time, the enhanced mobility rights are kept as a potential – as an insurance policy, a contingency plan or a set of opportunities that may one day be useful (*cf.* Cook-Martin 2013). The one way in which compensatory citizenship becomes relevant in everyday life is when using the second passport to cross borders. For individuals holding a second passport from a higher-tier country, border crossings become a site where they enact or reclaim their social privilege as dual citizens.

Below, I will explore the connection between cross-border mobility and stratification on the basis of material from two cases of compensatory citizenship in Israel and Serbia. The data include statistics from official and unofficial sources as well as interviews (50 in Israel, 48 in Serbia), most of which were conducted in 2014-2015.[5]

The Israeli case involves second- and third-generation Israelis who obtain citizenship from their families' European countries of origin (most commonly from Germany, Poland, Romania and Hungary). Since 2000, over 60,000 Israelis have acquired such long-distance EU citizenship (Harpaz 2013). The second case pertains to Serbian citizens who obtain Hungarian dual citizenship. The Hungarian law from 2011 offers "facilitated naturalization" without residence of renunciation requirements to descendants of Hungarian subjects from before 1918 (when Hungary controlled northern Serbia) who can speak the Hungarian language.[6]

Serbia: EU passport liberates from humiliation

Serbians have a strong practical incentive to seek a European Union passport.[7] Wages in Germany or Austria are about four times higher than in Serbia, and Serbians have been immigrating to those countries (and others in Western Europe) since the 1960s. Indeed, many Serbians acquire Hungarian citizenship with the aim of immigrating to Western Europe (far fewer immigrate to Hungary), and there is evidence of an increase in emigration from Serbia after 2011, as Hungarian citizenship became available. Here, I will set aside immigration and focus on experiences of crossing international borders and their connection to subjectivity and status.

In Serbia, the issue of international mobility brings painful associations. Until 2009, Serbian citizens were required to obtain a visa before they could travel to European Union countries. The visa requirement did not exist before the 1990s. The passport of communist Yugoslavia was a high-value passport that allowed its bearers to move freely around both the capitalist and communist blocs. Yugoslav citizens used that freedom to travel to Western Europe as tourists, shoppers and guest workers (Jansen 2009). In the early 1990s, a period of crisis and war in former Yugoslavia, EU countries began to require visas from all Serbian visitors. Visa applicants had to wait for hours outside foreign embassies and provide extensive documentation on their financial, personal and medical condition and travel plans.

Serbians experienced this regime of "global immobility" as a painful humiliation – a clear everyday reminder of the dramatic decline in the value of their citizenship. Many people responded by avoiding travel abroad altogether. In the mid-2000s, only 11 percent of Serbians had a valid passport (Tudurić 2008). As the anthropologist Stef Jansen (2009) points out, Serbians did not believe that European travel restrictions were a rational policy move meant to deter immigration; instead, they saw them as a malicious attempt to punish and humiliate Serbia and the Serbs. This

view was widely promoted by the Milošević regime because it strengthened Serbs' sense of victimization and discouraged domestic challengers (Lazić 2000). One of its lasting effects is that people still refer to EU visa requirements as "sanctions" (*sankcije*). Jansen (2009) described this situation as "geopolitical entrapment" in the "immediate outside" of the EU.

Starting in December 2009, Serbian citizens enjoy visa-free access to Schengen countries (they still need a visa to visit the UK). This means that adult Serbians have spent 17 years of their lives in so-called entrapment, having few opportunities to travel (except to neighboring countries). This experience bears heavily on the minds of Serbians – especially urban and educated elites, who used to travel extensively under communist Yugoslavia and who treat visits to Western Europe as central to their European self-identification.

The topic of cross-border mobility came up in many interviews as a central motivation for obtaining Hungarian citizenship. Respondents often said that they were determined never to be subjected to such restrictions again, and that the Hungarian passport was their way of making sure of that. In the course of explaining her decision to apply for a Hungarian passport, Gabrijela[8], a 27-year-old local government official from the city of Novi Sad, brought up the following episode:

"I visited the Czech Republic in 2008 and I had to wait for a whole day in front of the embassy [to get a visa]. It was so humiliating […] You had to prove that you had money, say where you will sleep, and pay up front. And then – maybe you will get [the visa], maybe you won't […] I hope we don't have to live through this again"

In this typical quotation, the seemingly-mundane experience of applying for a visa is charged with powerful emotions. Several components in this narrative highlight its traumatic

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character. In terms of time and space, Gabrijela says that she waited "for a whole day" and "outside the embassy," highlighting the dismissive and humiliating way in which the Czech embassy supposedly treated her time, comfort and dignity. Another aspect of the humiliation has to do with the flow of information: she had to provide extremely detailed information and answer invasive questions, whereas the embassy is not obliged to provide her with any information ("maybe you will get it, maybe you won't").

This humiliation is exacerbated because it is delivered by the embassy of a formerly communist country that Yugoslavs citizens were used to looking down on (Yugoslavia was richer than all its communist neighbors). Requesting a visa to visit such a country provides Serbians with a powerful illustration of their fall from grace. In the final sentence, Gabrijela switches to the plural form: "I hope *we* don't have to live through this again". The humiliating experience of visa application is not just her personal experience; instead, it is the collective experience of an entire generation. More specifically, it is the collective experience of the group within her generation (cf. Mannheim 1936): those who viewed travel to Europe as a central part of their identity and lifestyle but were barred from doing so.

Gabrijela continued: *"after 2009, we could travel with the Serbian passport everywhere, so I didn't need a Hungarian passport. But [in 2013] was some political problem [...] and they said Serbians might need visas, and I panicked and ran to do the [Hungarian] passport"*. She is referring to an EU threat to reinstate the visa requirement for Serbians in 2013.[9] Interestingly, she describes the feeling that drove her to acquire Hungarian citizenship as "panic," even though it would be equally logical to say that she made a rational, calculated decision. The choice of terms has to do with the trauma that was described in the previous paragraph: the experience of life under visa restrictions was so painful that she would do anything to avoid it being repeated. Indeed,

Gabrijela was one of many who responded in this way to the possibility of the visa requirement being reimposed: statistics collected by Hungarian authorities show that the number of citizenship applications shot up in 2013 (Harpaz 2016).

Respondents who obtained a Hungarian passport and used it for travel abroad reported a liberating experience which stood in stark contrast to their experience when using the Serbian passport. While respondents spoke often and passionately on the elevating and equalizing effect of the Hungarian passport vis-à-vis EU citizens – thus framing it within the context of global inequality – they were quite reticent and reluctant about the mobility gap it created vis-à-vis other Serbians who did not have EU citizenship. When it did come up, the effect of the passport on within-nation mobility gaps – mono-citizen vs. dual-citizen Serbians – was spoken of with unease, as something that evokes a sense of absurdity and even guilt.

Janos, a 34-year-old dual citizen from Vojvodina who now lives in the Netherlands, said:

"If you come to the EU with a Serbian passport you have to show them how much money you have, where you're going and for how long. After I got the Hungarian citizenship, they don't inspect me anymore. I just go. Which is really funny because I am still Serbian. It's just a piece of paper"

The Hungarian passport provides a feeling of liberation – "I just go" – in contrast to the constraints associated with traveling with a Serbian passport. At the time of the interview, Janos has had his Hungarian citizenship for less a year, and was still struck by the novel experience provided by the EU passport. This novel experience leads him to point out the absurd situation in which the same person receives a very different treatment depending on which passport they use.[10]

While Janos – a new dual citizen – emphasizes the absurdity of one person having two passports of divergent value, respondents who had the Hungarian passport for a longer time admit that it became part of their self-understanding and identity to a degree that they did not anticipate. Maria, a 32-year-old doctoral student from a town in northern Serbia, has held a Hungarian passport since 2011:

"Once I got the Hungarian [passport], I forgot all about this visa shit, I can't relate to it anymore. It was a different me who had to stand in all these lines. This is huge. It's even a bit unfair. [I can enter the U.S. without visa while] my friend who applied for a U.S. visa just got rejected because they thought she was going to stay there"

In this quotation, the possession of a different passport leads, over time, to a deep change in the person's self-understanding. The references to her experiences when traveling with the Serbian passport – "I forgot all about it", "can't relate to it", "a different me" – illustrate the way mobility (and the potential for mobility) touches at the root of her personality. This way of speaking is reminiscent of the discourses that people express dramatic changes in their lives, such as emerging out of poverty or emigrating to another country. It is therefore surprising to find such language being used to describe something that is supposedly so technical as changing one's travel document. Maria's narrative suggests that there is an existential gulf between travelers who use the Serbian passport (especially before 2009) and those using the Hungarian passport. This gulf was opened not only relative to Maria's former self ("a different me") but also relative to her mono-citizen coevals in Serbia. She feels guilty vis-à-vis her friends because the gap in terms of global mobility and status is experienced as so large so as to be unjustified and unfair.

These findings show that the enhanced mobility provided by Hungarian passport is eagerly used to obtain higher status in the global (or at least the European) domain, while the effect on within-national status differences is minimized and presented in negative terms. The scope of this paper does not allow me to explore the causes here, but I will mention three potential explanations: the discourse of competitive capitalism is relatively weak in Serbia (a communist country until 2000) and with it the tendency for competition through consumption; dual citizenship is only permitted in Serbia since 2004 and there is still some "bad conscience" about it; and finally, most dual citizens are ethnic Hungarians and they are wary about taking pride in their dual citizenship in ways that might appear provocative to the majority.[11]

Israel: EU passport as VIP ticket

In Israel, people also seek compensatory citizenship from EU countries and secure extra mobility through it, but their reasons are quite different from those that inspire Serbians. Contrary to Serbia, Israel is not a major emigrant-sending country. Moreover, those Israelis that do emigrate usually head for the United States, Canada or Australia (Cohen 2011). As very few Israelis emigrate to Europe, the EU passport is not perceived as means to emigrate. Indeed, over the period after 2000, as tens of thousands of Israelis have acquired EU citizenship, the rate of emigration from the country was actually declining (Harpaz 2013).[12] Beside the general desire to gain more opportunities in the EU, what seems to be a major motive for Israeli citizenship applicants is the wish to secure an "insurance policy": the second passport, respondents said, is supposed to provide a place to escape to in case Israel is destroyed by its enemies.

These fears of destruction often draw on family experiences and collective memories from the time of the Holocaust. Many Israeli families of European origin survived the Holocaust by

leaving their home countries at just the right time, or having the right papers. This was a lesson that was passed on through the generations: "you must always have a place you can escape to", in the words of one respondent of German and Polish parentage. Statistics that I collected from European embassies as well as citizenship lawyers show that interest in EU citizenship spiked in response to periods of terrorism or war (Harpaz 2016). The idea of an insurance policy rests, in the final count, on mobility: having a country's passport means that it can never refuse to accept you as a refugee (the national-binary aspect of mobility control as discussed on p. 9). Thus, as in the Serbian case (where the EU passport provides an option for labor migration), the practical value of compensatory citizenship is premised on mobility. Here, however, I will focus on the symbolic-affective aspects that come into play when the EU passport is used to cross borders.

First, let us look at the connection between international mobility and global stratification in Israel. In contrast to Serbians, who carried a trauma in the wake of the "humiliating" EU visa requirement, Israeli respondents did not report feelings of low status when traveling abroad. They were usually confident that with their Israeli passports, they would be received as welcome travelers and not treated as potential illegal immigrants or criminals. On the one hand, this difference between Israeli and Serbian perceptions is logical: not only does the Israeli passport offer significantly higher mobility – an index of visa-free travel ranked it 24th in the world, compared with the Serbian at 43rd place (HVRI 2017) – but, moreover, Israelis' visa-free access to the EU (including the UK) was never put in question. Like Serbians and most other nationalities, Israelis must obtain a visa before entering the U.S., but they did not perceive it as unjust.

On the other hand, Israeli travelers face some unique restrictions: 16 Muslim-majority (including Lebanon, Yemen, Iran and Saudi Arabia) categorically refuse entry to Israeli citizens; moreover, many Israelis feel that their nationality puts them at risk of being criticized, insulted or

even assaulted even when visiting friendly countries. Some dual citizens viewed their EU citizenship as a potential remedy for that situation – it would allow them to enter moderately hostile countries like Malaysia or UAE (nobody mentioned visiting Iran or Sudan) and to conceal their Israeli identity when in Europe. It is interesting to note, however, that respondents viewed those limitations and risks as natural, and liberation from them as a luxury or fantasy. They did not evoke outrage or humiliation, and were perceived as issues of politics and security, not global status.

This comparison illustrates two general points about perceptions of stratification and justice. First, people react strongly to changes in status – like the "sanctions" imposed on Serbia by the EU – whereas more permanent conditions (such as the boycott on Israel by many countries) come to perceived as natural and cease to provoke. Second, global status is determined by the policies of high-status countries – above all, Western countries who global prestige allows them to impose their "vision of divisions," in the terms of Pierre Bourdieu (1989). Low-status actors have little influence on status hierarchies. Thus, when the United States places severe restrictions on the entry of Iranians or Yemenis, this is seen as a provocative, humiliating step; when the same countries categorically refuse entry to Israelis, it is just politics.

Thus, most Israelis did not feel that their passports put them at a significant disadvantage in terms of international mobility and global status, and – unlike Serbians – did not expect their EU passports to equalize their mobility rights to those of other nations. Instead, they set their sights on another system of stratification: the local, intra-Israeli one. Many EU-Israeli dual citizens used their EU passports to secure a mobility advantage over other Israelis. Many respondents, especially the younger ones in their 20s and 30s, felt that possession of a European passport was an exclusive privilege that signaled distinction and high social status.

In order to explain the connection between social status and EU citizenship in Israel, a word is needed about the country's ethno-class makeup. One of the most significant socio-economic divides within Israeli-Jewish society is based on origin: Jews of Central and Eastern European origin (also called *Ashkenazim*) are a privileged group, while those of Middle Eastern and North African descent (*Sepharadim* or *Mizrachim*) are relatively underprivileged.[13] This inequality was originally tied up with political power. Jews from Central and Eastern Europe led the Zionist movement since its early beginnings in the 1890s; until the late 1970's, secular Ashkenazi Jews enjoyed complete political and cultural dominance in Israel (Kimmerling 2001).

Historically, two discourses were used to justify Ashkenazi privilege. The first was an ideology of republican virtue, within which groups were stratified on the basis of their contribution to the Jewish-Zionist collective. The predominately-Ashkenazi "serving elite" of settlers and fighters (epitomized in the *kibbutz*) occupied the top of the hierarchy in terms of influence and prestige (Shafir and Peled 1998). The second justifying discourse was a modernizing discourse, that constructed Ashkenazi Jews as modern and "European" in opposition to Middle Eastern Jews (as well as Arabs), who were "oriental" and primitive (Khazzoom 2003, 2008; Shenhav 2006).

Since the late 1970's, secular Ashkenazim no longer enjoy monopolistic political hegemony. Israel has become a more pluralistic society, with multiple groups competing over the state's political resources and cultural orientation (Kimmerling 2001). For example, the incumbent Likud party is usually identified with the ideals and interests of Middle Eastern and Russian-speaking Jews; some of its prominent politicians frequently speak out against "Ashkenazi elites" (even though the party's leader, Prime Minister Netanyahu, is of Polish and Lithuanian origin). Pluralization also transformed the country's economic structure: Israel has changed from a

collectivistic-socialist welfare state to a competitive free market society, where levels of income inequality are almost as high as in the U.S.

The shift to a pluralistic, free market society has weakened Ashkenazim politically but did not harm them economically; today, Israelis of European origin remain the most privileged sector in terms of income and education (Cohen, Haberfeld and Kristal 2007). Since the 1980s, Ashkenazim have been coming to terms with a change in their social position: from hegemonic majority to an elite. And with the weakening of the republican discourse (at least among secular Israelis), many of them no longer see themselves as a "serving elite" but rather as an economic-cultural elite that seeks distinction through consumption, education – and a Western self-identification. The retreat from republicanism is associated with an increase in the importance of the Eurocentric discourse, which is premised on a European/Western self-identification of secular Ashkenazim and a view of other Israelis as primitive and unenlightened (cf. Sasson-Levy 2013).

Within this context, the European passport operates as a perfect status symbol for young Ashkenazim, consistent with their new self-understanding as a Westernized elite. The European passport is a way of displaying their Ashkenazi origins, claim to Western identity and global cosmopolitanism – all at once (Harpaz 2013).

Passport controls at European airports became a social site where EU citizenship could be converted into a feeling of superiority (or, in Bourdieu's terms, symbolic violence). Omer, a 28-year-old high-tech workers from Tel-Aviv, explained that the one of the main reasons he obtained his Czech passport was because *it allows me easy access to European countries – you don't need to stamp it and all that, just show it and go through*. This quotation is not self-evident because the Israeli passport already provides "easy access" to European countries, and Israelis are practically never subjected to extra questioning or screening. The feeling of lightness and ease has

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to do with more than just the time spent waiting in line. Even though the amount of time that EU citizens save almost never exceeds ten minutes, the experience of the EU-nationals line came up in many interviews, and numerous respondents rhapsodized about the "pleasure" of taking it.

Indeed, when Israeli respondents discussed their experiences of traveling with the EU passport, the most commonly cited sentiment was pleasure (specifically, they used the word *kef,* meaning "fun"). This sense of pleasure had to do with a feeling of superiority at being admitted to EU-nationals line, which many Israelis experienced as a kind of "VIP line." Obviously, this sense of exclusive privilege and superiority does not arise from the comparison to Europeans (who do not experience the EU-nationals line as anything special), but vis-à-vis other Israelis who must use the non-EU nationals line.

If the preoccupation with lines and stamps seems petty, it must be remembered that situations like the passport control line, where people are hierarchically arranged in space, are a prominent site for the display of status differences. For many respondents, this is essentially what the European passport is about: not having to stand in the same line with other Israelis. This is illustrated by the story told by Yariv, a 29-year-old lawyer from Tel-Aviv. Using his Hungarian passport to gain access to the EU-nationals line, he said, is "one of my greatest pleasures when I visit Europe". He went on to tell:

> *On my last flight, I arrived in Spain on a plane full of charter-flight passengers who at best could get a Moroccan passport. And of course they all tried to get into the shorter EU-nationals line, but the local gendarmes drove them back. I went right through, while the other Israelis stayed there for another ten minutes. That was fun.*

In this account, the European passport appears as a global status symbol that reaffirms Israeli class boundaries along the familiar lines of ethnicity ("Moroccan passport", alluding to the Middle-Eastern origin of the other Israeli passengers), patterns of consumption ("charter flights" are all-included deals popular with lower-class Israelis) and "civilized" behavior ("they" are barbarically trying to push themselves into the line where they do not belong). The European police officer, by deciding who to let through and who to push away, provides objective, state-sanctioned validation to the distinction between those Israelis who are "European" and worthy, and those who are "non-European" and inferior. As the interviews made clear, many dual citizens think of the EU-nationals line as a VIP line: what makes it prestigious is the fact that other Israelis are not allowed to use it. Thus, the European passport serves as a portable status symbol that allows dual citizens to reproduce Israeli ethno-class hierarchy abroad and experience it in terms of an objectively justified global order.

Conclusion

This paper makes three main arguments. First, border crossings and passport controls are a key social site where people gain a real-life experience of their place within a global hierarchy premised on citizenship. Second, the global toleration of dual citizenship provides an opportunity for citizens of non-Western countries to obtain a second passport from a higher-tier country (compensatory citizenship) and use it to enhance their mobility and, through it, their status. Third, mobility may be converted into status in diverse manners. In Serbia, EU passports allow dual citizens to achieve equality with other Europeans and frees them from suspicion and humiliation when traveling abroad. In Israel, the EU passport is used to create symbolic inequality (distinction, in Pierre Bourdieu's (1987) terms) vis-à-vis other Israelis and experience a VIP status.

These findings open up several directions for future research. I will briefly mention two of them. The first concerns ways to study global inequality. The data show that people around the world are keenly aware of their position within the global hierarchy and that this consciousness leads to both emotional responses (e.g. humiliation, pride) and practical responses (for example, seeking a second passport). This lends support to the emergent perspective that analyzes the world as one society – a society where citizenship is the master status. Moreover, with the advent of dual citizenship, this crucial status is undergoing a change: from an ascribed status that one is born with and cannot change without great difficulty, to an achieved status that one may modify and strategize over one's lifetime. Future research could apply the insights and methods that have been developed for the study of within-national inequality to the analysis of global inequality. Some questions might include: How do people understand, experience and justify their position within global society? How do they use migration and citizenship strategies to move up that hierarchy?

The second set of questions concerns the way compensatory citizenship interacts with preexisting categories and identities, is shaped by them and modifies them. One thing to keep in mind when considering those questions is the dynamic nature of dual citizenship laws. For example, Serbia is an EU-candidate country and might join the Union sometime in the coming decade. This would naturally change the practical and symbolic meaning of Hungarian dual citizenship. In Israel as well, configurations of dual citizenship are in flux. In recent years, Spain and Portugal have passed laws offering citizenship to Sepharadic Jews – the descendants of Jews exiled after 1492, who mostly settled in North Africa, the Balkans and the Levant. As of now, the number of citizenships that have been actually given out to is very small. If this trend continues, however, it is sure to erase the association of EU citizenship with European-Ashkenazi origin and, with it, some of its usefulness as a strategy of social distinction.

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[1] The figures are for 2011. They are adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), which factors in differences in actual buying power between countries. Source: World Bank.

[2] Of course, other factors such as race, gender and social class, also play a role.

[3] Gaps in mobility extend beyond visa waivers. They also include gaps in countries' ability to provide consular protection, intercede on the part of their nationals abroad and evacuate them to safety if needed. Another important aspect of global mobility concerns agreements between countries to permit the free movement and settlement of citizens. The most important organization of this kind is the European Union, although other regional groupings exist in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Thanks to the institution of EU citizenship, citizenship from any European Union country provides access to the prosperous and secure territories of Western Europe (Kochenov 2010).

[4] In Argentina and Brazil, the most common citizenship that applicants acquired was Italian; in Cuba – Spanish; in Serbia, Ukraine and Romania – Hungarian; in Moldova – Romanian.

[5] See Harpaz 2016 for more details on the data and methodology.

[6] The language criterion is intended to restrict eligibility to ethnic Hungarians; however, many ethnic Serbs or ethnically-mixed persons actually studied Hungarian with the hope of obtaining citizenship.

[7] I use the term Serbians because I am referring to citizens of Serbia who are of diverse ethnic backgrounds: ethnic Serbs, ethnic Hungarians and people of mixed ethnicity (who sometimes identify as Yugoslavs).

[8] The names of all respondents were changed.

[9] This threat was made after large numbers of Serbian Roma filed asylum applications in EU countries (The Economist 2013).

[10] This echoes Bertolt Brecht's ironic observation in the book "Conversations in Exile", to the effect that "*the passport is the most noble part of a human being*" because "*it is therefore recognized when it is good, whereas a human being can be ever so good and still not be recognized*".

[11] However, some ethnic Hungarian respondents expressed happiness and pride that more Serbs were studying Hungarian and becoming interested in the language. The Hungarian political scientist Szabolcs Pogonyi (2017) who conducted interviews with dual citizen ethnic Hungarians in Serbia and Romania, did find evidence of ethnic competition and rivalry, which were relatively scarce in my data. For some of Pogonyi's respondents – especially in Romania – the Hungarian passport finally made them equal to the majority ethnicity in their own country (as well as to Hungarian in Hungary).

[12] On the other hand, EU citizenship did certainly facilitate various kinds of short-term movements of Israelis to Europe that might be too short-term to be captured in the migration statistics.

[13] *Mizrachim* literally means "Orientals" and usually refers to Jews from Arab countries and Iran.