To ask, 'how Judaism became a religion' is also to ask, 'how Jews became a race'; and why this is relevant in Europe today.

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(Draft, do not quote or copy)

Introduction

The title of my paper is a variation on the title of the book by Leora Batnitzky: *How Judaism became a religion.* My argument is that posing the question 'how Judaism became a religion is also to ask how Jews became a race'. I will explain what I mean to further a reflection on the uses and abuses of race in relation to religion in the European context today. I mainly concentrate on France but will also address how public discussions on race develop in the Netherlands and in Germany, in particular those concerning antisemitism and Islamophobia.
(I am trying to put some thoughts together here and sometimes perhaps lacking documentation about certain developments as I see them. I'd be happy to see myself corrected during the workshop).

As a first step, I make some remarks on the context of the use of race in European debates today, in relation to the use of race in anglophone Critical Race Theory and its reception in Europe, and the place of religion in this.

As a second step, I address the co-consitution of race and religion in nineteenth century France. One of the ironies of the French nineteenth century context of post-Emancipation is that Jewish collectivity, which had been variably understood in terms of peoplehood, or as a 'nation', in the 18th century – and which we could perhaps designate, for the moment, with the terminology developed by Ayelet Shachar, as a *nomos group* with legal, political, linguistic, cultural, and theological dimensions – *became* a 'religion' in the process of secularization. (I should talk about two *nomos groups* probably, in view of the differences between the Sefardi and Ashkenazi groups in pre-Revolutionary France).

To introduce a bit more where I will be going: Secularization or, in the terms of the French nineteenth century, Emancipation and lateron, '*assimilation*', implied the privatisation cum theologisation, i.e. religionization of Jewish collectivity. It led to the conception of Judaism as a religion and, in the late nineteenth century, to the emergence of a (reluctant) religious pluralism as an alternative to assimilation as full secularization, within the modern individual citizenship paradigm. (See further Jansen 2013 about De Clermont-Tonnerre, the brothers Reinach and Proust; Batnitzky, and many other historians of Judaism in France, Salo Baron, Pierre Birnbaum, Elizabeth Bellamy et al).

This modern process resulted, not in the disappearance of Judaism, nor in liberal secularism's projected outcome (freedom of religion *cum* religious privatisation/political muteness). All that happened only imperfectly and remained halfway. However, it did engender, paradoxically, the emergence of Jewishness as a racial category. This paradoxical effect was first addressed by Hannah Arendt in the chapter about antisemitism in *OT*. Zygmunt Bauman and other historians of Judaism in France did so too, and I tried to add my part in my book on Secularism and assimilation (2013).

IN that book, I also related this co-constitution of religion and race in the French 19th century context for Judaism to the current French context, in which 'secularization' is asked of Muslims who share some characteristics of *nomos groups*, or in any case, whose religious tradition and practices have visible, cultural, linguistic and legal-political dimensions. (As all religions do, including Protestantism, but some more than others.) I used the terminology of 'paradoxes of assimilation' to talk about the paradoxical effect of religionisation, and I also adressed the race and coloniality underlying the framework of religio-secularism. However, if I had to write the book again, I would probably merge

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these two themes more systematically: the paradoxes of assimilation and race, and this is what I set out to do in section 2.

As a third step, I address the consequences for today of the co-constitution of race and religion in the framework of expected secularization. I address the main line of reasoning of the editors of Charlie Hebdo and the French state today: antisemitism is racism, while Islamophobia is critique of religion, and the two should not be mixed up. To do so, in the eyes of the French state, is practicing *islamo-gauchisme*. (In the German and Dutch context we do not (yet) have that word as far as I know, but we do have similar position being taken. A German example can be found in a recent article in the *Jüdische Rundschau*, where many of those working in the fields of Intersectional Justice, Critical Race Theory and antisemitism/Islamophobia in Germany are portrayed as a large network of Islamicisation in Germany.)[1] I will explain why I think this is re-iterating the specific form of racialisation going along with assimilationism within a secular regime (and I try to acknowledge the hugely complicated context in which utterly cruel acts of terror are committed in the name of Islam, where there is a dynamics of securitization and jihadism difficult to understand and evaluate, and in which decolonial and postcolonial theories and activists rightly press European public spheres to finally adress the colonial and racial legacies *inside* Europe, instead of understanding the intersectional injustices mainly in civilisational, religio-secular and implictly or explicitly racialising terms).

Section 1. Ambivalences of 'race' in the European context today.

Europe's 'racelessness' (1950-2010)
In Europe (with exception Britain where race relations have been on the agenda for a long time – and taking my cue mostly from recent developments in public spheres in France, Nl, Dl) until recently 'race' has been a category at work in cultural memory, but hardly used as a reference term for scholarly debate, neither as an analytical term nor as a central category within research fields.

a. Largely following UN/UNESCO 1951-1952 rejection of the term race in connection to rejection of racism. Esther Romeyn, Etienne Balibar:
   UN and UNESCO borrowed from the disciplinary power of the sciences to develop policy instruments aimed at the "progressive abolition of racism by science and scientific vulgarization, pedagogy, and legislation."[2] Racism was based on "racial doctrine" and "racial myth," "a creed and an emotional attitude" that was a product of a "long-standing confusion of race and culture," and a "fundamentally anti-rational system of thought" thriving on "scientifically false ideas." Jews, the UNESCO statement on the race question read, "were sacrificed to beliefs about race which had no scientific validity."[3] In a sense racism is like religion, conceived in terms, in Romeyn's terms: 'closed and bounded worldviews. Overcoming prejudice is structured as a process of individuation and emancipation from collective myths, a model that follows the Enlightenment progressive ideal of humanity self-improvement. (Romeyn, PoP).
b. 'Racial Europeanization': Race in European cultural memory is connected to nazism/fascism within Europe itself, and outside Europe it is linked to coloniality, which is imagined as being undone through decolonization (Goldberg, Lentin). This memory constellation whitewashes European racisms, in connection to the denial of racism through its culturalisation into 'cultural racism', racism without races (Balibar). In the cultural memory that represses race in the European context post 1945, European/nazi antisemitism is imagined as a modern and secular, racial

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[1] 'Der 1-Millarde-Euro-Deal: Bundesregierung greift für die Islamisierung Deutschlands tief in die Tasche', Paul Möllers, https://juedischerundschau.de/article.2020-12.der-1-millarde-euro-deal-bundesregierung-greift-fuer-die-islamisierung-deutschlands-tief-in-die-tasche.html
[2] Balibar, 'The Construction of Racism', 6; 10.
[3] UNESCO, *Four Statements on the Race Question* (Paris: UNESCO 1969), 5; 17.

category connected to the biological/evolutionary imagination, and not as religious, while antisemitism among muslims is largely imagined as religious and related to Israel/Palestine, also in civilisational terms (Romeyn PoP 2020; Gil Hochberg about 'forgetting' Europe when analysing Jewish-Muslim relations, 2016 *Re-Orient*).

Europe's ambivalent return of race (2010-today)

In Europe, since about 2010, we see an increase of the academic and public relevance and reception of discourses of race in opposite, but interconnected ways. *There is an increasing public awareness of Europe's unacknowledged whiteness and racisms, and an activist and academic pressure not to avoid talking about race in that context. There is also increasing talk of race in the far right and this impacts the larger culture.* My argument is that we need to think these two developments together instead of focusing on either of them.

a. **Critical race. Critique of liberal difference blindness, emergence of CRT and intersectional justice in the universities, ngo's and governance.**

In the 1990s: multiculturalism/ Kymlicka/Carens/Shachar/Modood in terms of minority equality. Focus was difference and minority formation in language/ethnicity/*nomoi groups*/religion, and, in connection to it but not always congruent, feminism (Is multiculturalism bad for women?).

Today there is a more intensive reception of decolonial political philosophy (Mills), intersectionality (Crenshaw et al)., Black Studies, Black feminism, and here 'race' is increasingly used as a critical term. In tandem with the increasing acknowledgement of methodological whiteness (Bhambra), white ignorance (Mills), white innocence (Wekker), largely in the footsteps of decolonial theory/CRT developed in the U.S.

Sally Haslanger's working definition of race: **'**The questions I ask concern social justice and the primary phenomenon is White Supremacy. In this context of inquiry, races are best understood as social-political kinds that are historically constructed in the context of exploitation, expropriation, and cultural imperialism' (Haslanger, Global Race conference Paris december 2020).
Haslanger interprets races as social constructions within a socio-historical reality that produces them first, and then they have a detrimental effect within these social-historical realities. Ideologies, practices, concepts, perceptions of race are resulting in specific hierarchies and inequalities, produced by historical, interrelated phenomena: exploitation, expropriation, imperialism. Charles Mills uses race in a similar way, as a concept having emerged in the midst of and as a result of totally unjust social practices (plantation slavery and settler coloniality in particular) and perpetuating these injustices, when analysing white ignorance, and analysing difference blindness in Rawlsian conceptions of justice as sociologically and methodologically white, and inherently unjust (*Black Rights/White wrongs)*. Haslanger and Mills both acknowledging race's embeddedness in inherently unjust social practice, while also emphasizing its constructedness.

Within the European universities, with a bit of optimism, we can say that the critique of difference blindness and the need for teaching CRT is nearly consensual, and it is also increasingly taught and communicated in the European context. (Amsterdam, Berlin, f.e.) Such consensus is not available in public spheres, but there is increasing debate. Examples from NL, France, Dl:
In the *Netherlands*, this debate is often understood in terms of 'polarization': widespread white innocence and ignorance, but there is a lot in movement. Struggles over inclusion LGBTQI, cancel culture, critique of 'political correctness', woke, new anti-feminisms, 'this is not racism/sexism but neutrality', religious holidays, diversity. In particular those inspired by BLM frequentely refer to race and use it in the American sense, with reference to Black Studies and Critical Race Theory.

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In *France*, an analogous struggle is waged over Republican/laïcist conceptions of citizenship, (also, interestingly, regarding statistical strategies to register/not register religious/ethnic/racial affiliations). Macron: 'we are universal', *contra* communautarisme/séparatisme etc. (The result of the terminology of secularism is an extra focus on religion as the typical and most outstanding difference, and less on race, whiteness, coloniality. The latter have been brought up again and again by the *Indigènes de la République, CCIF*, Rokhaya Diallo, cases-rebelles, but also by academics working on Africa/Islam/colonial history etc, often now under suspicion of *islamo-gauchisme.*
In *Germany*, increasing attention for race in racisms. Center for Intersectional Justice Berlin, emergence of Critical Race Theory (To my knowledge Robin Celikates first time in philosophy in Germany in 2019), emergence of race and new study of racism in critical legal studies (Cengiz.) I would be interested to know more about how much of this work is translated into German or whether there is the problem that an increasing part of academic work is in English and does not get translated, as is the case in the Netherlands.

b. **'Return of phenotypical race'**,
Amade M'Charek (*American Anthropologist. Race/Face/ID*, biology, forensics, medicine.

c. **Race in far rightwing groups impacting public spheres.**
The *nouvelle droite* did not talk of race but of difference since the 1970s (Alain de Benoist et al). As Esther Romeyn notes (*Patterns of prejudice* 2020): 'In a self-described post-colonial, 'post-racism' world, such interior frontiers are increasingly erected around culture/religion. What has been alternatively termed neo, cultural, or differentialist racism nconstructs a "racism without race," that takes culture, rather than biology, as the root cause of "insurmountable differences."[4]

However, race is on the return in right wing groups. Increasing use of whiteness as a term of 'pride' instead of hidden behind neutrality, talk of whiteness as European (Venner (50s already), the boréal with Le Pen, Baudet, 'clash of civilizations' into 'great replacement'. This discourse goes from the *nouvelle droite* to the mainstream. Leeuwenkamp and I call this in a recent article, 'the pull to the right of the right', and religion plays a role here too.

The right of the right constructs a whiteness that is a contextually inflected and complicated mix of race, nation and religion/worldview (Christian and/or secularist). In the American context, whiteness has been thoroughly Americanized and often figures as white nationalism, but it is often also recast in terms of (white) Christianity. In the European context, majorities pulled to the right of the right often identify themselves in civilizational terms concerning Europe rather than in national ones. Often, a secular-religious dyad is used as a criterion, for example when Europe is identified as a secular, pagan or Judeo-Christian region, and Islam and 'illegal migration' serve as central oppositional categories and are intimately related in political imaginaries.[5]

Over the last decade, however, the civilizational markers have increasingly been complemented by explicitly racial references, for example to a so-called European 'boreal', or Indo-European civilization, instead of a merely Judeo-Christian, Christian or secular one,[6] and by the

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[4] Esther Romeyn, 'Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Spectropolitics and Immigration', *Theory, Culture & Society* 31, no. 6, 2014, 77–101.

[5] Rogers Brubaker (2017) 'Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative perspective', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 40:8, 1191-1226. See Stewart, B. (2020). The Rise of Far-Right Civilizationism. *Critical Sociology*.

[6] The notion 'boréal' refers to most Northern and polar regions of Europe and is being used in far-right circles to express the idea that the 'original' European population was white and came from the North and should try to return to that whiteness, instead of succumbing to the 'great replacement'. It stems from the fascist dictionary and was introduced in the *nouvelle droite* through the work of René Guénon and the Italian Julius Evola. Jean-Marie Le Pen used it in an interview in 2015 with the magazine Rivarol, entitled 'we must save Europe and the white world'. The Dutch politician Thierry Baudet, whose FvD party came out second biggest in provincial

deliberate discursive turn by a European New Right towards a the vision of a 'great replacement' of white majorities by non-whites, and the breeding of a 'fear of white extinction'.[7] With our notion of the 'pull to the right of the right', we want to indicate how these themes have spread into our political imagination in a variety of ways that are not reserved to the far right, but that 'pull' the right further to the right, generally, and in many places draws the left with it.[8] As journalist Thomas Chatterton Williams, after tracing the French influences on the American right of the right puts it: 'The belief that a multicultural society is tantamount to an anti-white society has crept out of French salons and all the way into the Oval Office. The apotheosis of right-wing Gramscism is Donald Trump'.[9]

Wrap up about the ambivalence of race:
Use of race is necessary in the European context if we work from a critical standpoint – if only to introduce the critical thinking connected to it in the anglophone world, the U.S. in particular (whiteness, intersectionality, racial capitalism, legacies of Atlantic slave trade in Europe, CRT, coloniality). But phenotypical and naturalized race conceptions have a strong history in Europe, in connection to right wing racial legacies. Moreover, there are translation problems and the context is relevant and different in Europe: there is a need of awareness of what we conjure up when talking of 'race' in German, French, Dutch? Rasse (DL), ras (NL), do not have the same uses and frequency of use as in English, both in the U.S. and in Britain (race relations).

2. Race and religion in France; *Paradoxes of assimilation and race*

To the title of my paper:
Book by Leora Batnitzky: *How Judaism became a religion.* The title of my paper is a variation on the title of that book. Asking 'how Judaism became a religion is also to ask how Jews became a race'.

Secularization as assimilation
From a secularization perspective, the irony of the French nineteenth century context of post-Emancipation is that Jewish collectivity, which formed a *nomos group* in the terminology of Ayelet Shachar, with legal, political, linguistic, cultural and theological dimensions, *became* a 'religion' in the process of secularization: Secularization implied the depoliticization and privatisation of a collective tradition. This was understood, in the French nineteenth century, in terms of *assimilation*, and it led to the conception of Judaism as a religion and the emergence of a (very reluctant) religious pluralism as an alternative to full assimilation. (See further Jansen 2013 about the brothers Reinach, Batnitzsky and others, and, Salo Baron, Pierre Birnbaum and other historians of Judaism in France), in combination with full individually oriented citizenship.

Hannah Arendt, in origins of totalitarianism, was one of the first to address that precisely this process of assimilation/secularization/becoming religion, went together with a paradoxical outcome: the emergence of Jews as a race. The iteration of 'religion', as it had come to mean 'personally adopted

elections in the Netherlands in 2019, used the term twice in programmatic texts. See Stéphane Francois (2014) *Au-delà des vents du Nord*, Presses Universitaires de Lyon.

[7] Bhatt, C. (2020). 'White Extinction: Metaphysical Elements of Contemporary Western Fascism'. *Theory, Culture & Society*. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276420925523. Cheetan Bhatt argues that one general element in the right of the right, for which he uses the word 'fascism', is the 'fear of white extinction'.

[8] We wrote this before the American elections from 2020 which give hope that the 'pull' will become less effective, but specifically because of the ecological dimension of the pull, as we will explain in what follows, there is ample reason for not underestimating the force that it could soon regain.

[9] Thomas Chatterton Williams, 'The French origin of 'you will not replace us', 8

belief' in the course of modernity, gained prominence as a social and governmental category especially in the nineteenth century. This development went hand in hand with a political discourse requiring the assimilation/secularization of Jews, and an uncoupling of Judaism from culture, law and peoplehood. The latter dimensions of the collectivity, were in a complicated manner reassembled category of race that took part of the elements of collective belonging that mirrored ethno-religious background. In the French case, Jews, after the French Revolution, were on the one hand enabled to 'emancipate' by rendering their Judaism into a personal belief irrelevant to their citizenship, while, on the other hand, were increasingly identified as a collective in terms of their Jewish 'race'. In her *Origins of Totalitarianism*, Hannah Arendt offered an early analysis of how this is relevant to the way 'race' in Europe came to be forged by religion and secularization, distinguishing Judaism (as a collective tradition) from Jewishness (as a racial category) that followed with the privatization of 'being Jewish'. In a posthumously published article she wrote in the 1930s, Arendt had already stressed the interconnections of these categories, and their constructedness in majority imaginaries:

> Whether the Jews are a religion or a nation, a people or a race, a state or a tribe, depends on the special opinion non-Jews—in whose midst Jews live—have about themselves, but it certainly has no connection whatever with any germinal knowledge about the Jews. As the people of Europe became nations, the Jews became 'a nation within the nation'; as the Germans began to see in the state something more than their political representation, that is, as their fundamental 'essence,' the Jews became a state within a state. […] And since the end of the last century, when the Germans transformed themselves at last into Aryans, we have been wandering through world history as Semites . . .

In this mode of thought, Judaism, as a concept, as image, as the religion of the Other, is a formative part of how both Christian and secular visions of Europe/in Europe rely on the racial–religious nexus. Two aspects are important to bring together here:

Paradoxes of assimilation and *suspicion in the race-religion nexus; their structural dimensions and actuality*
Perhaps the specific dimension of assimilation as a movement of making ethno-religious belonging invisible (becoming 'religion' and their return in terms of 'race'), enhances a specific dynamic where 'race' becomes specifically related to the collective dimensions 'hidden' behind the 'religion', and with it, becomes a source of suspicion and fear rather than loathing or superiority. In the context of my earlier book on Proust's narrative of assimilation in the context of the Dreyfus Affair, I referred to Bauman's understanding of assimilation to understand this process. One of the important insights seemed to me:

> The host majority is extremely difficult to satisfy. It would be quick to point out that the ostensibly assimilated citizen of Jewish origin wears a mask too thin to be trusted; that, when scratched, the mask readily reveals the unprepossessing likeness of the uncivilized being the assimilants swore to have left behind. By far the most expedient way to divert the hosts' suspicions was to compete in casting aspersions on one's own discredited past[10].

The work of Proust and the social play of reading 'signs' in relation to the Dreyfus Affair is an enormously elaborated spinning out of this insight. The more one secularized, 'privatised' and made invisible one's background as a Jew, the more attractive it became as a social game to 'detect' the signs of Otherness 'behind' one's appearance, and the more French citizens started to 'read' their

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[10] Zygmunt Bauman, 'Assimilation into Exile,' my italics, see my reading of the Proustian narrative of assimilation in 2013, and in *Constellations 2009*.

possibly Jewish co-citizens[11]. Thus, privatisation has a dimension of 'private', secret, that plays up in times of conflict. In the Dreyfus Affair it played up after the Franco-German War and in the increasing nationalism running up to WWI; today we see a comparable mechanism with Muslims who, in relation to actual terror and finance from Saudi-Arabia, are screened by secret services, but also by majorities, for 'signs' of not belonging, of being Other, whereby the screening and suspicion far exceed 'clear and present danger' indicators, and go from visible practices such by wearing hijab, burkini, niqaab, to perceived signs of 'hidden' affiliations, a network of 'islamisation' under the heading of fighting islamphobia, islamo-gauchisme etc. The secular-religious framework only stimulates the perception of 'behindness', of being 'derrière a/le voile'. During a recent conversation I had with French colleagues under suspicion of *islamo-gauchisme*, we were talking of critical race theory, decolonial studies, their emergence and relative freedom and welcoming in the Dutch universities and their problematisation in France. These colleagues said, studying Islam from a non-secularist/statist perspective is already seen as problematic in the French context, but doing 'decolonisation' or 'coloniality' is even more difficult, and this part of why Islam is seen as a screen behind which a politics (of anti-racisme and decoloniality) is lurking. The trouble here is that through generalised suspicion, legitimate critique of coloniality and injustice, and critical approaches towards state, police etc, come into a position of being secret, private, behind the scenes, while they should form legitimate part of public debate and also do form part of public life and academic life. Here perhaps academics should take more initiative to discuss these structural dimensions related to suspicion in the race-religion nexus, perhaps in Derridian fashion to be called 'suspicio-religioraciality', in relation to the securitization of academic life and the larger European societies, and concrete threats of terrorism in the name of Islam and membership of Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist organisations as 'hidden'. (Here link with Kauthar Bouchallikht – Vidino – affair in the Dutch Context.)

Wrap up section 2: In this brief 19th century genealogy we see that it is precisely within the process of modernization, of secularization, that race and religion emerge as a couple. Playing them out against each other, as in 'is this religious or racial discrimination, is it racism or religion, leaves this co-constitutiveness unacknowledged (see as well Topolski, Pop, same issue.)

Section 3. Racism and Critique of Religion

Charlie Hebdo, critics of notion of Islamophobia.
Islamophobia is an unhappy notion. Esther Benbassa about 'judéophobia' as another unhappy notion. Hatred, fear, association with something at all you could have a phobia for. Also its genealogy is unhappy. Perhaps it could be replaced by anti-Muslim racism, but see Brian Klug's philosophy of language approach, about pragmatic reasons to keep using Islamophobia as a collector-concept of a body of critical literature, critical energy, anti-racism. Especially in the French context today it seems difficult to cease using the notion without also delegitising those struggling against it and under suspicion of the French state (CCIF in the first place) ((Take into account too: religio-secularism, intricacy of coloniality and conceptions of Islam, 'being Muslim, statut personnel Algeria.))

In any case, when the notion of Islamophobia would get replaced by anti-Muslim racism, perhaps in the context today, we would encourage the idea that racism is bad, but critique of Islam, fear of Islam, perhaps even hatred of Islam, are ok. Much public debate about Islamophobia and racism rests on a distinction between critique of religion (and, therefore, of 'Islam'), deemed legitimate because it targets opinion, ideology and belief, and racism – in which antisemitism is located. (Note the crucial distinction between critique and fear and hatred, but it is often not addressed). Illustrating this train of

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[11] Practices of 'screening' partly also developed with regard to Freemasonry, and to homosexuality, see Brian Cheyette on Proust Ref.)

thought in an editorial in Charlie Hebdo, editor-in-chief Gérard Biard writes, on 1 March 2017, fourteen months after the murder of his colleagues:

> Islamophobia has been conceptualised on the basis of a deliberately vicious postulate: critiquing Islam is insulting all Muslims. Antisemitism, by contrast, hits the Jews without distinction, whether they are believers or atheists, stick to religious practices or do not. It has as a target human beings for what they are, not for what they think or believe. Islam is a religious and political doctrine, that even implies a societal project. It is something that one chooses, or that one sees imposed on oneself. Such a thing can be the target of critique, but not of racism. Critique of a doctrine, of its rules, symbols and of those who promote them is perfectly legitimate in a democracy. It is even one of its foundations. So let's talk about the real problem and ask a real question: those who do not stop talking of Islamophobia, do they desire to finish with democracy?

Problem is that religion and race are too interconnected to make such a neat opposition between racism and targetting religion. The opposition is more complicated, but also not irrelevant or not valid. First is to distinghuish, legally and publically, between critique and fear/hatred/racism/incitement to hatred. Relevant to take into account from a broader perspective, also with the history of the humanities in mind:

1. *The nineteenth century emergence of category of the Semite and the race-religion nexus.*
   In the history of anti-racism, race has often been seen as a socio-biological, secular category, especially as it developed in Europe as antisemitism under nazism. Later, on that account, it was replaced by 'cultural racism' (Etienne Balibar; others did not want to talk of racism in that sense, and rather used culturalism, ethnicism). Antisemitism, in that line of thought, is a secular transformation of religious, Christian anti-Judaism (as Arendt also saw it). This genealogy has proven problematic if we look at the use of 'race' in the nineteenth century. We can see this in relation to the category of the Semite. German humanists developed the category of 'Semites' in the early nineteenth century. It contained both biblical and cultural-historical connotations, and is one example of how biblical legacies were carried over into 'secular' scholarship in the early disciplinary humanities. The racial dimension became particularly evident in Ernest Renan's work *Histoire des langages sémitiques* (1855), which constructed a notion of 'Semites' as a 'race sémitique', also 'race monothéiste' (in contrast to a 'race indoeuropéenne') as a category bringing together a group of peoples with a specific (and static) 'character' (again, in contrast to an Indo-European 'race' (see Jansen and Meer 2020; add references on Haeckel and 19th century evolutionary take on biblical traditions and legacies today).
   Takeaway for now: race has deeply theological roots and is closely related to imaginaries concerning religion, in which in the nineteenth century Judaism and Islam came close to each other and were contrasted with Christianity and Enlightenment/secularity. This genealogy important to take into account when discussing race/antisemitisme/islamophobia in Europe, also to address how Europe tends to withdraw to the background, as in whiteness, but then regarding Jewish-Muslim relations (Gil Hochberg).
2. In the American contexts, complications of race-religion from early onwards in coloniality by Sylvia Wynter, Ella Shohat, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Geraldine Heng, Suzanna Akbari, Matthea Westerduin et al: Coloniality, damnés, 'dehumanisation' and race, and connection to religion: *sin secta*, no soul for those not honoring the God of the Bible. 'Race' as category coming up after conversions to Christianity and need to justify exploitation after it (Gerbner).
3. Historiography of the European humanities (and consequently, the self-understanding of Europe in relation to human rights, democracy, anti-racism. Perhaps particularly nasty here is the disciplinary division between philosophy and religious studies/Jewish studies/Islamic studies/ethnic studies: how is this distinction marked by religio-secularism? In philosophy

departments modern history of philosophy is still largely the history of 'secular philosophy', line Descartes-Hume-Kant-Hegel-Heidegger-Habermas-Foucault-Derrida. (and the disticntion with the Middle Ages hardly questioned, and with little reference to Jewish-Arab dimensions of Middle Ages – see Jean-Christophe Attias). With Levinas-Derrida there was a serious place for Judaism, it seemed in the 1990s, but in many places the study of their work has gone to Jewish Studies and complit (as did the work of Mendelssohn, Geiger, Cohen, Rosenzweig, Goldziher, Levinas): like all earlier Jewish reactions to the Enlightenment/secular (and actually also Christian-legacy) canon, not to mention 'analytical' philosophy which does not deal at all with European plural history and the nineteenth century nationalist and colonial construction of the 'canon'. Add to that: History of Islam in European thought, comparative historiographies of the Abrahamic religions, work of Attias, Miriam Leonard etc.: Religious exclusions all over, but how are they related to the repression of the racial sides of that historiography, also within religious studies?